




Security Audit

Full Audit Report For Apeing



Client: Apeing

<https://www.apeing.com/>

November 6, 2025

Version: 1.1

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1 Disclaimer

This security assessment does not guarantee the security of the program instruction received from the client, herein referred to as "Source code."

The Service Provider will not be held liable for any legal liability arising from errors in the security assessment. The responsibility for ensuring the security of the program instruction will be solely with the Client, herein referred to as "Service User." The Service User agrees not to hold the Service Provider liable for any such liability.

By contract, the Service Provider is committed to conducting security assessments with integrity, professional ethics, and transparency in delivering security assessments to users. The Service Provider reserves the right to postpone the delivery of the security assessment if necessary, regardless of the reason for the delay. The Service Provider will not be held responsible for any delayed security assessments.

If the Service Provider identifies a vulnerability, we will notify the Service User via a Preliminary Report, which will be maintained in confidence for security purposes. The Service Provider disclaims responsibility in the event of any attacks occurring before or after conducting a security assessment. All responsibility for ensuring the security of the program instruction will be solely with the Service User.


Please be advised that the Security Assessment is not an investment advisory document and should not be interpreted as such. We hereby disclaim any liability arising from any investment:

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2 Security Assessment Procedure



- **Request:** The client must submit a formal request and follow the procedure. By submitting the source code and agreeing to the terms of service.
- **Audit Process:** Check for vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities from source code obtained by experts using formal verification methods, including using powerful tools such as Static Analysis, SWC Registry, Dynamic Security Analysis, Automated Security Tools, CWE, Syntax & Parameter Check with AI ,WAS (Warning Avoidance System a python script tools powered by SCRL).
- **Security Assessment:** Deliver Preliminary Security Assessment to clients to acknowledge the risks and vulnerabilities.
- **Consulting:** Discuss on risks and vulnerabilities encountered by clients to apply to their source code to mitigate risks.
- **Re-assessment:** Reassess the security when the client implements the source code improvements and if the client is satisfied with the results of the audit. We will proceed to the next step.
- **Full Audit Report:** SCRL provides clients with official security assessment reports informing them of risks and vulnerabilities. Officially and it is assumed that the client has been informed of all the information.



3 Risk Rating

Risk rating using this commonly defined: **Risk rating = impact * confidence**

- **Impact:** The severity and potential impact of an attacker attack
- **Confidence:** Ensuring that attackers expose and use this vulnerability

Confidence & Impact [Likelihood]	Low	Medium	High
Low	Informational	Low	Medium
Medium	Low	Medium	High
High	Medium	High	Critical

Severity is a risk assessment It is calculated from the Impact and Confidence values using the following calculation methods, Risk rating = impact * confidence It is categorized into 7 categories severity based

Severity Risk	Description
Critical	Critical severity is assigned to security vulnerabilities that pose a severe threat to the smart contract and the entire blockchain ecosystem.
High	High-severity issues should be addressed quickly to reduce the risk of exploitation and protect users' funds and data.
Medium	It's essential to fix medium-severity issues in a reasonable timeframe to enhance the overall security of the smart contract.
Low	While low-severity issues can be less urgent, it's still advisable to address them to improve the overall security posture of the smart contract.
Informational	Used to categorize security findings that do not pose a direct security threat to the smart contract or its users. Instead, these findings provide additional information, recommendations



4 Category

Category	Description
Centralization	Centralization Risk is The risk incurred by a sole proprietor, such as the Owner being able to change something without permission
Economics Risk	Economics Risk is Risks that may affect the economic mechanism system, such as the ability to increase Mint token
Logical Issue	Logical Issue is that can cause errors to core processing, such as any prior operations that cause background processes to crash.
Authorization	Authorization is Possible pitfalls from weak coding allows unrelated people to take any action to modify the values.
Mathematical	Any erroneous arithmetic operations affect the operation of the system or lead to erroneous values.
Naming Conventions	naming variables that may affect code understanding or naming inconsistencies
Security Risk	Security Risk of loss or damage if it's no mitigate
Coding Style	Coding Style is Tips coding for efficiency performance
Best Practices	Best Practices is suggestions for improvement
Optimization	Optimization is performance improvement
Gas Optimization	Gas Optimization is increase performance to avoid expensive gas
Dead Code	Dead Code having unused code This may result in wasted resources and gas fees.
Input Validation	Proper input validation is essential to ensure that a smart contract processes only valid and anticipated data. Failure to implement robust input validation mechanisms may lead to various security vulnerabilities, including logic manipulation, unauthorized access, and unintended contract behavior.



5 Executive Summary

For this security assessment, SCRL received a request on **November 3, 2025**



Audit Score	Project Website	X (Twitter)	Telegram
9.4	https://www.apeing.com/	https://x.com/apeingcoin	https://t.me/apeingcoin

Client	Confidential	Audit Method	Language
Apeing	Private	Static Analysis + Dynamic Analysis + Manual Review + Formal Verification + Hyper Fuzzing + WAS (Custom Detector)	Solidity

Vulnerabilities Summary:



2

Total Findings

2

Resolved

0

Mitigated

0

Acknowledge

0

Declined

0

Critical

Critical severity is assigned to security vulnerabilities that pose a severe threat to the smart contract and the entire blockchain ecosystem.

0

High

High-severity issues should be addressed quickly to reduce the risk of exploitation and protect users funds and data.

0

Medium

It essential to fix medium-severity issues in a reasonable timeframe to enhance the overall security of the smart contract.

0

Low

While low-severity issues can be less urgent, it still advisable to address them to improve the overall security posture of the smart contract.

2

Informational

Resolved: 2

Used to categorize security findings that do not pose a direct security threat to the smart contract or its users. Instead, these findings provide information



6 Audit Information

Audit Scope:

File	SHA1-Hash
src/Apeing.sol	d4557daa5a313cbbcf55beea22199407f3654705

Onchain Scope:

Chain	Contract Address
Not Deployed	-

Security Assessment Author:

Name	Role
Chinnakit J.	CEO & Founder
Ronny C.	CTO & Head of Security Researcher
Mark K.	Security Researcher

Smart Contract Audit Summary:



The results of the security assessment revealed

No Critical Vulnerabilities.

Full Audit Report For Apeing
November 6, 2025



Digital Sign:



SWC Checklist

ID	Title	Scanning	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Completed	No Risk
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Completed	No Risk
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	Completed	No Risk
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	Completed	No Risk
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Completed	No Risk
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Completed	No Risk
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Completed	No Risk
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Completed	No Risk
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Completed	No Risk
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Completed	No Risk
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Completed	No Risk
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Completed	No Risk
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Completed	No Risk
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Completed	No Risk
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Completed	No Risk
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Completed	No Risk
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Completed	No Risk
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Completed	No Risk
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Completed	No Risk
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Completed	No Risk
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Completed	No Risk
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Completed	No Risk



ID	Title	Scanning	Result
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Completed	No Risk
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Completed	No Risk
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Completed	No Risk
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Completed	No Risk
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Completed	No Risk
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Completed	No Risk
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Completed	No Risk
SWC-129	Typographical Error	Completed	No Risk
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Completed	No Risk
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Completed	No Risk
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Completed	No Risk
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Completed	No Risk
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Completed	No Risk
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Completed	No Risk
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Completed	No Risk



OWASP Smart Contract Top 10 2025 Checklist

ID	Title	Scanning	Result
SC01:2025	Access Control Vulnerabilities	Completed	No Risk
SC02:2025	Price Oracle Manipulation	Completed	No Risk
SC03:2025	Logic Errors	Completed	No Risk
SC04:2025	Lack of Input Validation	Completed	No Risk
SC05:2025	Reentrancy Attacks	Completed	No Risk
SC06:2025	Unchecked External Calls	Completed	No Risk
SC07:2025	Flash Loan Attacks	Completed	No Risk
SC08:2025	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Completed	No Risk
SC09:2025	Insecure Randomness	Completed	No Risk
SC10:2025	Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks	Completed	No Risk



7 Findings List



0
Critical

0
High

0
Medium

0
Low

2
Informational

This security assessment report for **Apeing** a total of **2 vulnerabilities**. The evaluation was conducted using the **Static Analysis + Dynamic Analysis + Manual Review + Formal Verification + Hyper Fuzzing + WAS (Custom Detector)** security assessment methodology.

ID	Vulnerabilities	Severity	Category	Status
SNC-01	Conformity to Solidity naming conventions	Informational	Coding Style	Resolved
UIC-01	Arithmetic Operations Not Wrapped in unchecked Block	Informational	Gas Optimization	Resolved



8 Findings

SNC-01: Conformity to Solidity naming conventions

Vulnerabilities	Severity	Category	Status
Conformity to Solidity naming conventions	Informational	Coding Style	Resolved

Finding Code

```
✗ Constant Apeing._decimals (src/Apeing.sol:33) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
✗ Constant Apeing._initialSupply (src/Apeing.sol:30) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
✗ Constant Apeing._name (src/Apeing.sol:31) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
✗ Constant Apeing._symbol (src/Apeing.sol:32) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
```

Description

The smart contract does not fully adhere to Solidity's standard naming conventions. Consistent and conventional naming improves readability, maintainability, and helps avoid confusion or misinterpretation of a contract's intent.

Recommendation

It is recommended to refactor the contract to fully comply with Solidity's official naming conventions. This practice aligns with industry standards and facilitates more effective collaboration, auditing, and code comprehension.

Alleviation

[2025-11-06] Apeing Team has already fixed this issue by refactoring the code

On line 30-33

```
uint256 private constant _INITIAL_SUPPLY = 16_750_000_000 * 10**18;

string private constant _NAME = "Apeing";

string private constant _SYMBOL = "$APEING";

uint8 private constant _DECIMALS = 18;
```

On line 41, 45, 49, 57

```
41: _mint(msgSender(), _INITIAL_SUPPLY);

45: return _DECIMALS;

49: return _SYMBOL;

57: return _NAME;
```

References

Solidity Style Guide – Solidity Docs <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/style-guide.html>



UIC-01: Arithmetic Operations Not Wrapped in unchecked Block

Vulnerabilities	Severity	Category	Status
Arithmetic Operations Not Wrapped in unchecked Block	Informational	Gas Optimization	Resolved

Finding Code

```
30: uint256 private constant _initialSupply = 16_750_000_000 * 10**18;
82: _approve(degenApe, spender, _allowances[degenApe][spender] + addedValue);
100: _approve(degenApe, spender, currentAllowance - subtractedValue);
132: _totalSupply += amount;
133: _balances[account] += amount;
148: _balances[from] = bananaBalance - amount;
149: _balances[to] += amount;
164: _approve(tokenOwner, spender, currentAllowance - amount);
174: _balances[account] = bananaBalance - amount;
175: _totalSupply -= amount;
```

Description

The contract performs arithmetic operations (e.g., +, -, *) that are guaranteed not to overflow due to surrounding logic or bounds checking, but these operations are not enclosed within an unchecked block.

Since Solidity 0.8.0, all arithmetic operations include automatic overflow and underflow checks by default, which adds additional gas costs. When the operation is provably safe — such as incrementing a loop counter within a bounded range or subtracting a known smaller value — wrapping the expression in an unchecked block can reduce gas usage by avoiding unnecessary checks.

Recommendation

Wrap arithmetic expressions in an unchecked block when:

- Overflow is provably impossible, and
- The operation is performed in gas-sensitive contexts, such as loops.

Alleviation

[2025-11-06] Apeing Team has already fixed this issue by refactoring the code

On line 82-88

```
uint256 currentAllowance = _allowances[degenApe][spender];

uint256 newAllowance;

unchecked {

    newAllowance = currentAllowance + addedValue;
```



```
}  
  
if (newAllowance < currentAllowance) revert ApeSwingTooFar();  
  
_approve(degenApe, spender, newAllowance);
```

References

Solidity Docs – Unchecked Arithmetic: <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/control-structures.html#checked-or-unchecked-arithmetic>



A Appendix

A.1 Hyper Fuzzing

Function	Status
apeing_approve(address,uint256)	✓
apeing_burn(uint256)	✓
asset_approve(address,uint128)	✓
apeing_increaseAllowance(address,uint256)	✓
apeing_transfer(address,uint256)	✓
switch_asset(uint256)	✓
asset_mint(address,uint128)	✓
switchActor(uint256)	✓
add_new_asset(uint8)	✓
apeing_decreaseAllowance(address,uint256)	✓
apeing_burnFrom(address,uint256)	✓
apeing_transferFrom(address,address,uint256)	✓
AssertionFailed(..)	✓



A.2 Source Units in Scope

Source Units Analyzed: 1

Source Units in Scope: 1 (100%)

Type	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
	src/Apeing.sol	1	***	205	180	124	28	95	Σ
	Totals	1	***	205	180	124	28	95	Σ

Legend:

- **Lines:** total lines of the source unit
- **nLines:** normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
- **nSLOC:** normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
- **Comment Lines:** lines containing single or block comments
- **Complexity Score:** a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)



A.3 Visibility, Mutability, Modifier function testing

Components

 ****Contracts	 ****Libraries	 ****Interfaces	 ****Abstract
1	0	0	0

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

 ****Public	 ****Payable
13	0

External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
13	18	0	3	3

StateVariables

Total	 ****Public
7	0

Capabilities

Solidity Versions observed	 ** Experimental Features**	 ** Can Receive Funds**	 ** Uses Assembly**	 ** Has Destroyable Contracts**
0.8.20		***	***	***

 ** Transfers ETH**	 **** Low-Level Calls	 ** DelegateCall**	 ** Uses Hash Functions**	 ** ECRecover**	 ** New/Create/Create2**
***	***	***	***	***	***

 ** TryCatch**	Σ Unchecked
***	yes

Dependencies / External Imports

Dependency / Import Path	Count
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol	1



Dependency / Import Path	Count
@openzeppelin/contracts/ utils/Context.sol	1



A.4 Contracts Description Table

Contracts Description Table

Contract	Type	Bases		
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Apeing	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata		
L		Public !	●	NO !
L	decimals	External !		NO !
L	symbol	External !		NO !
L	balanceOf	External !		NO !
L	name	External !		NO !
L	approve	External !	●	NO !
L	totalSupply	External !		NO !
L	allowance	External !		NO !
L	increaseAllowance	External !	●	NO !
L	transfer	External !	●	NO !
L	decreaseAllowance	External !	●	NO !
L	transferFrom	External !	●	NO !
L	_approve	Internal 🔒	●	
L	_mint	Internal 🔒	●	
L	_transfer	Internal 🔒	●	
L	_spendAllowance	Internal 🔒	●	
L	_burn	Internal 🔒	●	
L	burn	External !	●	NO !
L	burnFrom	External !	●	NO !



Legend

Symbol	Meaning
●	Function can modify state
💵	Function is payable





A.5 Call Graph



A.6 UML Class Diagram

Apeing Apeing.sol
Private: _balances: mapping(address=>uint256) _allowances: mapping(address=>mapping(address=>uint256)) _totalSupply: uint256 _INITIAL_SUPPLY: uint256 _NAME: string _SYMBOL: string _DECIMALS: uint8
Internal: _approve(tokenOwner: address, spender: address, amount: uint256) _mint(account: address, amount: uint256) _transfer(from: address, to: address, amount: uint256) _spendAllowance(tokenOwner: address, spender: address, amount: uint256) _burn(account: address, amount: uint256) External: decimals(): uint8 symbol(): string balanceOf(account: address): uint256 name(): string approve(spender: address, amount: uint256): bool totalSupply(): uint256 allowance(tokenOwner: address, spender: address): uint256 increaseAllowance(spender: address, addedValue: uint256): bool transfer(to: address, amount: uint256): bool decreaseAllowance(spender: address, subtractedValue: uint256): bool transferFrom(from: address, to: address, amount: uint256): bool burn(amount: uint256) burnFrom(account: address, amount: uint256) Public: constructor()



About SCRL

For partner

Proven Cybersecurity Expertise



Highlight



Cyber-attacks are ineffective when our customers utilize our services.

Our customers enjoy the highest level of cybersecurity, and we have successfully prevented any significant cyber attacks against them. Over the past three years, we have dedicated significant efforts to safeguarding our customers' data and systems.



Cybersecurity Assessment and Penetration Testing by Multiple Experts

Our team comprises experienced security researchers and penetration testers with expertise in Web3 and Blockchain, as well as general industries. Our primary focus is conducting comprehensive security assessments to provide secure solutions to our valued customers.



Collaborative law enforcement investigations

We have provided assistance to victims in numerous cases, including the Pig-butcher Scam, Hybrid Scam. Through collaborative efforts with law enforcement agencies, we have successfully secured justice through the court system.

SCRL is a dynamic cybersecurity team that provides security assessments, penetration testing, and incident investigations. We utilize specialized tools, expertise, and frameworks to enhance security measures. Additionally, we develop robust internal tools tailored to our organization's needs.

SCRL is committed to driving security for the blockchain industry and businesses alike.

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